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The "Constitutionalization" of the UN

Security System
MatthiasJ. Herdegen

ABSTRACT

The considerable activism displayed by the Security
Council over the last years and its dynamic applicationof the
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter recently have
inspired concern for the institutional balance within the
United Nations and the quest for justiciable restraints upon
the Council. Such concern underlines a "constitutional"
approach to the United Nations framework: the Charter is
conceived as a kind of constitution for the community of
states with the InternationalCourt of Justice as the ultimate
guardian of its legality vs-&-vis the Council.
Such a
"constitutional"approachshould be viewed with caution. The
scrutiny of mandatory Council resolutions by the International
Court of Justice must be confined to legal defects that release
Member Statesfrom compliance; that is, to defects that render
the resolution null and void. Such a qualification by the
Court, always declaratory in character,is justified only when
the Council has manifestly exceeded its powers under the
Charter or violated peremptory norms of public international

law.

* Dr. Jur. habil. (Heidelberg), Chair for Public and International Law,
University of Konstanz. This article is dedicated to Dr. Jur. Dr. h.c. Jochen A.
Frowein upon his sixtieth birthday.
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TOWARD A JUDICIAL "DOMESTICATION" OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL?

A. New Issues in a New World Order
The considerable vitality that the United Nations Security
Council recently has displayed, especially since Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, marks not only a shift in this body's "chemistry" but also
a more dynamic perception of the Security Council's own field of

action.'

The Security Council's declaration that the world

community enjoys the most favorable conditions for the
preservation of peace and security since the foundation of the
United Nations 2 reflects a rather serene understanding of Its own

actual role. The Security Council's new activism, however, has
not always met with satisfaction;

there has been concern

1.
See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action In Lieu of War.
"The Old Order Changeth." 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Richard B. Lillich,
HumanitarianIntervention Through the United Nations: Towards the Development of
Criteria,53 ZarrscHRIFr FriER AUsLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT
557 (1993); W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis In the United Nations, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993).
2.
Note by The Presidentof Security Council at 5, UN Doc. S/23500 (1992).
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regarding the lion's showing of teeth and flexing of muscles. The
unprecedented activation of powers under the auspices of
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, addressing
"Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression,"3 has caused uneasiness about
the extent of the lion's hunting grounds and provoked calls for a
lion tamer. Some of the beneficiaries of the paralyzing conflict
between the United States and the late Soviet Union now find
themselves uprooted from the cozy shelter of client-state status
and exposed to the new reality of a world lacking the
The first signs of a
counterbalancing forces of bipolarism.
forceful, albeit incoherent, enforcement of widely shared values
have spurred a growing choir of scholars to voice concern about
the paramount influence of the only remaining superpower within
the United Nations, the Security Council, and to express doubts
about the legitimacy of this body's potential for intervention.
Within the UN system, the searching eye lands on the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the final arbiter of

legitimacy, with the fashionable call being for "constitutional"

restraints to be placed on the power of the Security Council and
enforced by the ICJ.
In past decades, the Security Council's actions have given
rise only rarely to questions about the scope of its competence.
The Security Council's declaration that the South African
Constitution of 1983 was illegal as a "further entrenchment of
apartheid"4 stands as an example of the hitherto unquestioning
acceptance of the Security 'Council's exercise of power. The
natural indignation regarding the manifest racial discrimination
embodied in this constitution swept away any doubts cautiously
ventilated by some Member States, regarding the United Nations'
competence to declare the basic law of a Member State null and
void. It is only recent practices that have raised fundamental
questions about the justiciability of the Security Council's
actions. These issues crystallized in the Lockerbie case s with the
ICJ's ambiguous deference to a Security Council Resolution

3.
U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII.
Chapter VII includes Articles 39-51, and
addresses the Security Council's authority to "determine the existance of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide what
measures" are necessary
"to maintain or restore international peace and
security." Id. art. 39. The Security Council is given the authority in Chapter VII
to bring economic sanctions or take military action against offending states. Id.
arts. 41-42.
4. Political and Security Questions:Africa, S.C. Res. 554, 1984 U.N.Y.B. 161.
U.N. Doc. S/ 16700.
5.
See Infra part I.C.
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adopted pursuant to Chapter VII. No less intriguing is the issue
of Bosnia and whether the Security Council may tie a state's
hands in a struggle for survival by imposing an arms embargo
both against the Serbian aggressor and the victim. 6 Aside from
the problem of the victim's clean hands in the ongoing armed
conflict, the case of Bosnia presents a more fundamental
question:
Are there justiciable limits to Security Council
intervention that has the effect of strangling a state?
The discussion of limitations on the Security Council's ability
to intervene, of the possible invalidity of Security Council
resolutions, and of judicial review reaches to the very core of the
functioning of the UN security system: the obligation of Member
States to comply with Security Council resolutions under Article
25 of the Charter. Article 25 states that "[tihe Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." 7 A
pronouncement by the ICJ declaring a Council resolution invalid
presents potentially dramatic and ironic scenarios. States will
have to consider the possibility of being sued before the ICJ for
having complied with a resolution that allows or compels the
infringement of another Member State's rights. If the ICJ deems
compliance with a Security Council resolution to violate
international law, such a decision may invite or oblige
noncompliance.
Of course, it may be argued that behavior
sanctioned by a Security Council resolution enjoys a presumption
of legality. If an ICJ ruling removes this presumption, however,
this rebuttal would seem to be on shaky gounds. Moreover, this
presumption does not prevent a Member State from invoking the
manifest illegality of a resolution and, concurrently, the lack of
any binding effect. On the other hand, if Article 25 strictly covers
and justifies action based on a resolution, regardless of its
adoption intra or ultra vires, the discussion of judicial review

shrinks to an essentially academic exercise. In proceedings at
the Hague, the issue of ultra vires would be moot. The possibility
must be reserved, however, for Member States, and concurrently
the ICJ, to be able to charge the Security Council with having
abused its power in manner sufficiently gross and evident to
defeat the obligation of obedience mandated under Article 25.
This residual capacity should be justified only in exceptional
cases. A parallel should be drawn between the obligations under
Article 25 and mandatory compliance with ICJ judgments

6.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnla-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993
I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8).
7.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
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The example of the United States

government declaring the ICJ's judgment in the Nicaragua case a

nullity nonetheless invites a high degree of caution in regards to
admitting the validity of challenges.
Two other conceptual alternatives must be dismissed. The
concept of limited compliance with mandatory resolutions 9 may
appear attractive at first sight, for it maintains the binding effect
of a mandatory resolution at least until the ICJ's intervention.
Legal certainty and the justifying effect are thus preserved for a
transitional period. Judicial powers of annulment with general
effects pro futuro have no basis, however, either in the Charter or
in the Statute of the ICJ. In addition, the basis for judicial
intervention is too slim to support this model, as long as any
judicial review depends on jurisdiction in terms of Article 36 of
the ICJ Statute,' 0 and as long as any judicial pronouncement

8.
Article 94(1) states that: "[elach Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party." Id. art. 94(1).
An example of limited compliance with a mandatory resolution is an
9.
obligation to comply only until a Court's ruling to the contrary.
10. Article 36 states that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of
the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory Ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
Jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally
or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for
a certain time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to
the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall
be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance with
their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
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upon the validity of a Security Council resolution is merely
incidental.

Moreover,

mandatory

resolutions

analogizing

to

the

limited

compliance

invocation

of

with

changed

circumstances. under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Article 62)11 does not stand up to scrutiny. A different
legal appraisal of a given situation by the ICJ could only be a

material circumstance if the ICJ's judgment of a situation
contemplated under Chapter VII trumped the Security Council's
assessment of the situation. Arguments drawn from the Vienna
Convention therefore seem circular. Another option also must be
ruled out: mandatory compliance without necessary justification
in subsequent proceedings. This concept would turn compliance
into 'a legal gamble by throwing the risk of potential illegality
upon the Member States without any possible release from
compliance under Article 25.
An obligation to carry out
mandatory resolutions without a correlative justification would
destroy the coherence of the UN system. There cannot be two
separate legalities, a subjective one for the Security Council
vindicated by Article 25, and another objective legality for judicial
determination. Thus, the UN order depends far more upon the
continuing and comprehensive loyalty of its members than the
internal order of states with national legal systems possessing
manifold mechanisms to ensure compliance by their citizens in
spite of the possible judicial annulment of domestic rules.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153.
11. Article 62 is entitled "Fundamental Change of Circumstances." It states
that:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and
which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party
invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other
international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
3. If. under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a
fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty.
Convention on the Law of Treaties, done on May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27, reprintedIn 1969 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 140, 156, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/7.
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B. Elements of the Security Council's New Dynamism
The quest for a judicial counterweight to the Security Council

must be examined in light of the Security Council's new dynamic

understanding of its own competence.12 In this context, three
new components can be distilled from recent practice: (1) A more
expansive construction of the notions "threat to the peace" and
13
"breach of the peace" under Article 39 of the UN Charter, both
concerning international legal violations in the absence of an
interstate conflict, and of the application of this Article without
conclusive evidence; (2) the exercise of creative, quasi-legislative
functions by new bodies established for dispute resolution; and
(3) the resort to adjudicative functions under Chapter VII.
The expansive approach to the UN Charter, which broadly
interprets the "breach of the peace" formula enunciated under
Article 39, provided the basis for the Security Council's
intervention at the end of the Second Gulf War to protect
minorities in Iraq against repression.14 The second practice, the
creation of new fora for dispute resolutions is apparent in the
Security Council's establishment of the United Nations
Compensation Fund (Fund) to meet claims against Iraq flowing
from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait and to create a
commission to administer the Fund.' 5 The Security Council also
created an international tribunal to prosecute violations of
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia' 6 and adopted a
statute for the tribunal.I7 With respect to the activity of these

12. See Reisman, supra note 1, at 92-94.
13. Article 39 states that: "Ithe Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.

14. See S.C. Res. 688, 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) ("condemning repression of the
Kurds; requesting the U.N. Security Council to pursue humanitarian assistance").
See also S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/Res/794 (1992) (more sweeping resolution on
humanitarian intervention in Somalia). On this new dynamism, see generally
Thomas M. Franck, The Security Council and "Threats to the Peace:" Some
Remarks on Remarkable Recent Developments 83 (July 21-23, 1992) (printed for
private circulation only, as part of the Hague Academy of International Law
Workshop 1992 on the Development of the Role of the Security Council) (on file

with the author).
15. S.C. Res. 687, 30 I.L.M. 847, 852 (1991) (Security Council's request for a
plan to develop the Fund); S.C. Res. 692, 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991) (creation of the
Fund). See John R. Crook, The United Nations CompensationCommLssion-A New
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1993).
16. S.C. Res. 827, 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
17. Statute of the Int'l Tribunal,Annex, S.C. Res. 808, 31 I.L.M. 1192 (1993).
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auxiliary organs of the Security Council, the implications of
judicial review are particularly intriguing. Can a party challenge
binding decisions of these judicial or quasi-judicial organs before
the International Court of Justice, either for lacking
constitutionally valid powers or, at least, for exceeding the
mandate set forth by the Security Council? The controversial
Lockerbie case is illustrative of the issues surrounding the resort
to quasi-adjudicative measures. Relying on its powers under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council enjoined
Libya to surrender two Libyan nationals considered responsible
for the Lockerbie terrorist attack.' 8 These three categories of
Security Council activism under Chapter VII underscore the
potential breadth and impact of ICJ judicial review.
C. The ICJ's Understandingof Its "Constitutional"Function
The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice offers
little clear cut guidance regarding its "constitutional" function visA-vis the Security Council. Judicial scrutiny of the Security
Council's action appears a kind of Pandora's box, the opening of
which the ICJ holds cautiously reserved for special scenarios.
The ICJ's advisory opinion in Certain Expenses of the United
Nations points out only that under the UN Charter no procedure
exists for determining the validity of an organ's act and indicates
that "each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its
own jurisdiction."*9 Similarly, the ICJ's advisory opinion in the
Namibia case notes that "[ulndoubtedly, the Court does not

possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
decisions taken by the United organs concerned."2 0 In spite of
this language, the ICJ did examine the merits of French and
South African objections to the Assembly's resolution on the
termination of the mandate for South West Africa and to the
subsequent Security Council resolution on the same subject; the
ICJ ultimately held that the General Assembly had acted intra
vires. 2 1 Observers have termed this inquiry a sort of judicial
review of the "constitutionality" of the termination of the
mandate.2 2
The ICJ's reasoning, however, did not refer to
18. S.C. Res. 748. 31 I.L.M. 750 (1992). See Christopher C. Joyner & Wayne
P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerble: What Lessons for
InternationalExtraditionLaw?, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 222 (1993).
19. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Jul. 20).
20. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 45 (Jun. 21) [hereinafter Namibla Case].
21. IcLat45,54.
22. E. Jim~nez de Ardchaga, United Nations Security Council, In 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 345, 347 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1983).
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Security Council action under Chapter VII. Moreover, the judicial
scrutiny undertaken in this instance can be explained by the lack
of an explicit competence regarding the termination of the
mandate. Therefore, the advisory opinion in the Namibia case
ultimately does not permit any general conclusions about the
relations between the ICJ and the Security Council. In this same
case, the ICJ deferred to the judgment of the "appropriate
political organs of the United Nations acting within their authority

under the Charter." 23 Inferences drawn from these cases must
have due regard to their context: noncontentious proceedings
based on a request for advice by the General Assembly.
In the Lockerbie case,2 4 Libya sought protection against
pressure by the United States and the United Kingdom aimed at
achieving the surrender of two Libyan suspects in the bombing of
Pan Am flight 103 under the auspices of Article 41 of the ICJ
statute.2 5 The Libyan application indirectly challenged Security
Council Resolution 731 (1992), which had supported the
American and British requests. Libya argued that the United
States and the United Kingdom had violated its sovereign right to
choose between criminal prosecution and surrender of the
subjects as protected by the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
of 1971.
During the pendency of the proceedings regarding
Libya's Article 41 request for provisional measures, the Security
Council passed Resolution 748 (1992) pursuant to Chapter VII of
the UN Charter and ordered the Libyan government to comply
with the extradition requests. The ICJ, relying on the summary
character of proceedings under Article 41, did not squarely
address the issue of judicial scrutiny of the Security Council's
action. Instead, the ICJ deferred, somewhat evasively, to the
Security Council's exercise of competence under Chapter VII. 2 6
23. Namibla Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 55.
24. Order with Regard to Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures
in the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. U.K.). 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14), (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.),
1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14), reprintedIn 31 I.L.M. 662 [hereinafter Lockerble Case].
25. Article 41 states that:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 10, at 1061.
26. The Court stated:
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As several separate opinions by concurring or dissenting
judges point out, the ICJ, however, left open the door to judicial
examination of Security Council resolutions. 2 7 The cautious
wording of the ICJ's reasoning suggests that the forbidden area in

which the ICJ fears to tread is confined to Chapter VII.

Less

reluctance to interfere with the Security Council's actions,
therefore, might be expected in a potential conflict involving
nonbinding measures under Chapter VI.28
The ICJ's decision in the Lockerble case has provoked a host

of comments upon the ICJ's future role and the separation of
powers within the United Nations. 2 9 While authoritative voices
have hailed the ICJ's decision as the dawning of a Marbury v.
Madison approach to judicial review,3 0 others have detected

"unsound constitutional policy reasoning" in the decision. 3 1 It

remains to be seen whether this focus on "constitutional"
thinking, the implantation of domestic legal concepts, does not
distort the perception of the ICJ's function.

[Bloth Libya and the United States, as Members of the United
Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter;... the Court. which
is at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures, considers that
prima facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in resolution
748 (1992); and. . . in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, their
obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations
under any other international agreement, including the Montreal
Convention; . . . the Court, while thus not at this stage called upon to
determine definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution 748
(1992), considers that, whatever the situation previous to the adoption of
that resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention
cannot now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of
provisional measures.
1992 I.C.J. at 126-27.
27. See Id. at 129 (declaration of acting President Oda); 138 (separate
opinion of Judge Lachs); 140, 142 (separate opinion of Judge Shabuddeen).
28. See Id. at 175-76 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (stating that
the International Court of Justice would not be precluded from reviewing Security
Council resolutions by a resolution under Chapter VI).
29. See Thomas M. Franck, The Powers of Appreciatlon: Who Is the Ultimate

Guardian of the UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992); Bernhard Graefrath,
Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court The Libyan Case, 4 EUR. J. INTL L.
184 (1993); Reisman, supra note 1, at 86; Alfred P. Rubin, Libya, Lockerble and the
Law, 4 DIPL. & STATECRAFT 1 (1993); Christian Tomuschat, The Lockerbie Case
Before the International Court of Justice, 48 REv. INT'L CoMMISSION OF JURISTS 38
(1992); Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism,JudicialReview, and the World Court,
34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993); see also Torsten Stein, Das Attentat von Lockerbie vor
dem Sicherheitsratder Vereinten Natlonen und dem InternatlonalenGerlchtshof, 31
ARCIH- DES V6LKERRECHTS 206 (1993).

30.
31.

See Franck, supra note 29, at 520; see also Watson, supra note 29.
Reisman, supra note 1, at 87.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF THE

UN SECURITY SYSTEM
Discussion of judicial review must focus primarily on its
implications for the system of collective security established by
the UN Charter, rather than on academic speculations
analogizing the United Nations to various domestic systems and
their doctrines of separation of powers. The current fascination
of recent commentators with such constitutional parallels
demonstrates that this elementary principle has not been
adequately considered.
Nonbinding measures adopted by the Security Council under
Chapter VI or Article 39 of the Charter certainly cannot a priori
preempt the ICJ's consideration of a corresponding behavior by
Member States, 3 2 once the ICJ's jurisdiction is established. In
light of the different dispute settlement functions of the Security
Council, on the one hand, and the ICJ, on the other, there is no
direct conflict of competencies between these two branches. It
follows from the principle of mutual cooperation, 33 however, that
the exercise of any judicial discretion is guided by due
consideration of the Security Council's position. 34
Rights
protected by "hard" law under custom or treaty are not
suspended by nonbinding measures of the Security Council in
proceedings before the ICJ. Thus, in the Lockerble case, any
rights asserted by Libya under the Montreal Convention could not
have been trumped by Resolution 731 (1992). The clash between
a recommendation by the Security Council and a court order

does not have only political consequences. A legal doctrine justly
recognizes that nonbinding Security Council resolutions prima
facie justify corresponding behavior of Member States.3 5 A
conflicting ICJ decision removes this presumption of legality.

32.

Cf. Lockerble Case, 1992 I.C.J. at 175-76 (dissenting opinion of Judge

Weeramantry) (stating that decisions made by the Security Council under Article
39 are not revisable by the Court).
33. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
1950 I.C.J. 65, 82 (Nov. 30) (separate opinion of Judge Acevedo).
34. Conversely, the Security Council's position Is guided by the ICJ's
exercise of judicial discretion. On this aspect of mutual loyalty among organs of
the United Nations, see Eckart Klein, ParallelesTdtlgwerden von Sicherheltsratund
Internatlonalem Gerlchtshof bel frledensbedrohenden Streltigkelten,
In
VOELKERRECHT ALS REcHTSORDNUNG,

(1983).
35.

FESTScHRIFT FOR HERMANN MOSLER 468, 481

Jochen A. Frowein, Collective Enforcement of International Obligations, 47

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDIScHES OFFENTLICHES REcHT UND V(OLKERREcHT 67, 70

(1987).
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With respect to binding decisions under Chapter VII, the
situation is more intricate. This analysis must start from Article
25 of the Charter, which obliges the Member States to comply
with mandatory resolutions. 3 6 Similarly, Article 48 of the Charter
obliges members to implement the decisions of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
according to the Security Council's determination. 3 7 The mere
existence of judicial review would have a dramatic impact on the
functioning of the UN security system, for neither the Charter nor
the ICJ Statute vests the ICJ with any powers to strike down
binding decisions adopted pursuant to Chapter VII. During the
travaux prdparatoirespreceding the adoption of the UN Charter,
Belgium proposed an amendment that would have allowed a
State, whose "essential rights" might be infringed by a resolution
of the Security Council, to request an advisory opinion by the
ICJ.38 Later, however, Belgium withdrew this proposal. The lack
of specific annulment powers means that any ICJ judicial
scrutiny must focus on the invalidity of a Security Council
decision and not on mere illegality as such. The ICJ is confined
to scrutinizing these decisions for superficial legal defects that
would deprive a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of its
binding effect. Such declaratory and incidental scrutiny is no
larger in scope than sound objections raised by a Member State
against the validity of a resolution. If the legal violations do not
reach the threshold of voidness, judicial examination of a
violation of the Charter, or of other rules which the Security
Council may have to respect, would be merely an academic
exercise. A mandatory resolution, even if tainted by illegality,
compels and accordingly justifies corresponding compliance
under Article 25 as long as the resolution is valid. The ICJ's
exercise of judicial scrutiny, therefore, must be confined to legal

defects sufficiently grave to defeat the Member States' duty of
compliance.

36.
37.

Judicial cognizance thus does not stretch farther

See supra text accompanying note 7.
Article 48 states that:
1.

The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be
taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the
Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the

United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate
international agencies of which they are members.
U.N. CHARTER art. 48.
38. See Lockerble Case, 1992 I.C.J. at 175-76 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry).
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than any Member State's freedom to challenge a decision of the
Security Council.
More important is the converse implication: The scrutiny
pertaining to the invalidity of a Security Council resolution as
performed by the ICJ may be undertaken by all Member States.
This is the other side of the coin. Any excessive activism by the
ICJ has a serious impact on the degree of Member State
compliance with Security Council decisions and, consequently,
on the functioning of the United Nations security system as a

whole. This consideration does not dismiss, however, the value of
judicial review for legal certainty, so long as judicial self-restraint
regarding declarations of invalidity gives due regard to these
functional implications. The difference between a Member State's
objection and the ICJ's review lies only in the authority of the ICJ
as the ultimate nonpolitical forum for dispute resolution. An
objection to the validity of a Security Council resolution will claim
hardly rebuttable plausibility once it finds clear support in a
ruling of the ICJ.
The inherent risk of eroding the Security Council's authority
is much greater in the case of incidental declaratory scrutiny,
than in the hypothetical case when the ICJ exercises the power of
judicial review expressly conferred upon it by a change of its
governing statute. Such a new explicit competence to strike down
resolutions of the Security Council could be construed to
provisionally guarantee the binding effect of a decision under
Chapter VII from objections regarding its validity until a ruling by
the ICJ. Nothing in the present system provides this preliminary
protection to the Security Council's authority; instead, there is
only the mere presumption of legality and validity enjoyed by
resolutions that serve the UN purposes and were adopted
according to the relevant rules of procedure.3 9 The invalidity of a
Security Council resolution destroys any binding effect ab initlo.
In light of the correlation between the extent of the ICJ's
power to declare a resolution invalid and the objections available
to a Member State, invalidity 4 o arguably justifies the latter's
unilateral noncompliance. Justified noncompliance turns on the
conditions under which a Member State is released from
compliance with a Security Council resolution purporting to have
a binding effect under Article 25 and Article 48 of the Charter. A
resolution of the Security Council binding under these provisions
necessarily must be respected by the ICJ and precludes a full-

39.

Cf. Namibla Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 22 (Advisory Opinion), Klein, supra note

34, at 484 (against a presumption of legality for Council resolutions).
40. Invalidity is understood as voidness ab Inltio.
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fledged inquiry of the factual and legal situation so far as it is
covered by the resolution, (or more precisely, by its tenor).
A cardinal issue is the Security Council's power to make
concrete the broad and open phrases of Chapter VII. Any
authoritative determination regarding Article 39 or other
provisions of Chapter VII, both as to facts and law, cannot be
questioned by the ICJ, if covered by the Security Council's
competencies. This power of authoritative construction refers to
interpretation as well as to the appreciation of facts. Beyond
those competencies authoritatively concretized in the Charter, the
ICJ may be barred from inquiring into the legality of a Security
Council's decision to the extent that legal defects do not destroy
its validity and its binding effect under Article 25 and Article 48
of the Charter.
These observations apply not only to objections against a
Security Council decision that altogether deny this decision's
validity, but also to a narrow construction curtailing the ambit of
a resolution in conflict with the Security Council's intent. The
basis of this construction is a scrutiny aiming at interpretation in
conformity with the Charter and other principles of international
law, which the Security Council may be bound to respect. The
application to the ICJ by Bosnia-Herzegovina, arguing that the
Security Council resolutions imposing a weapons embargo upon
the former Yugoslavia must be construed in a manner compatible
with the applicant's right of self-defense, furnishes a recent
example of this construction. 4 1 The analogy to an individual
state's interpretation of its laws in conformity with its own
constitution, is obvious. In-both cases judicial construction
depends upon review in light of superior law.
Conceptual analysis calls for a word of caution and for some
clarification regarding opposing perspectives about the extent and
role of judicial review in the UN system. This discussion is
subject to a risk of misunderstandings that, without excessive
simplification, may be related to a gap between two different
visions:
a realist approach on the one hand,42 for which
limitations upon powers are meaningless unless seconded by
judicial review, and a normative approach, on the other, which is
more concerned with a statutory basis for judicial intervention. It
certainly would be an undue, though tempting, generalization to
term the first approach the "United States" and the second the
"European" perspective of judicial review. For many scholars, the
41. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993
I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8).
42. The "realist" approach was inspired by an enchantment with the
teachings of Marbury v. Madison.
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United States approach, as enunciated in Marbury v. Madison,
recommends itself as a mechanism necessary to turn inherent
limitations of power into practically relevant restraints. These
scholars conceive controversies regarding the scope of the
Security Council's competence as a form of political gamble to be
settled authoritatively by the International Court of Justice as the
appropriate nonpolitical forum.
The lack of an explicit
authorization of judicial intervention is, from this view, a
negligible factor in the quest for institutional balance. The

opposite, normative approach to judicial review advocated in this
paper focuses more on a clear statutory basis for "constitutional"
review and functional checks. This perspective takes a look at
the justiciable illegality of Security Council action, especially in
light of its dramatic impact on the standard of compliance under
Article 25.
In the context of this approach, the notion of "invalidity"
assumes crucial significance. Within the UN system, in the
absence of a clear statutory basis for the ICJ's intervention in the
administration of Chapter VII, the concept of invalidity applied to
a Security Council resolution must be taken at its face value: as
meaning
that the act is null and void ab Initio.
This
understanding of invalidity as absolute nullity, opposed to.mere
voidability depending on judicial review, finds forceful support in
the opinion of Judge Morelli in the CertainExpenses case.43

43.

Judge Morelli wrote:

In the case of acts of international organizations, and in particular the acts
of the United Nations, there is nothing comparable to the remedies existing
in domestic law in connection with administrative acts. The consequence
of this is that there is no possibility of applying the concept of voidability to
the acts of the United Nations. If an act of an organ of the United Nations
had to be considered as an invalid act, such invalidity could constitute
only the absolute nullity of the act. In other words, there are only two

alternatives for the acts of the Organization: either the act is fully valid, or
it Is an absolute nullity, because absolute nullity is the only form in which

invalidity of an act of the Organization can occur. An act of the
Organization considered as invalid would be an act which had no legal
effects, precisely because it would be an absolute nullity. The lack of effect
of such an act could be alleged and a finding in that sense obtained at any

time.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1962 I.C.J. 150, 222
(July 20) (opinion of Judge Morelli).
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THE Focus ON "CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS" AND ITS

FALLACIES

A. The "Constitutional"Approach and Its HeuristicValue
In the choir of international doctrine, authoritative voices
have focused the actual discussion regarding the authority of UN
bodies on constitutional underpinnings. From this perspective,
the Charter appears as a "constitution" of delegated powers.44

This approach vests the ICJ with the role of the ultimate guardian

of the whole system's legitimacy. 4 5
Similarly, the Lockerbie
decision of the International Court of Justice is placed in context
with the search for a "better approximation of a modern
46
constitution" and for "constitutional restraints."
This constitutional approach certainly possesses some
merits.
It emphasizes that the Security Council, though a
political organ, is conflned to legally determined powers flowing
from a treaty. The binding effect of Security Council resolutions
cannot be severed from compliance with legal rules that limit the
Security Council's political choices. The Member States of the
United Nations certainly do not submit themselves to any
decisions of the Security Council that purport to be binding.
Rather, the invocation of Chapter VII is no magic formula for the
Security Council's dispensing with respect for express and
implied Charter limits for its actions.
On the other hand, the constitutional perception is of
doubtful heuristic value. The underlying analogy risks blurring
fundamental differences between the nature of the UN system
and classic issues of the separation of powers in a truly
constitutional context. There is no solid basis for these analogies
from which any persuasive conclusions may be drawn.
In
structural density, the United Nations Charter is still far from a
closed system of competencies in which the application of
constitutional concepts really makes sense. In light of the actual
distribution of functions between the General Assembly and the
Security Council and the ICJ, the invocation of a "separation of
powers" is merely a form of speech.
Generally, there are very few multilateral agreements in

which the reference to constitutional concepts is particularly
helpful. One, possibly the only, example is the system of the
European Union (EU). Unlike the United Nations, the EU truly
exercises competencies that have been transferred to it by the
44.
45.
46.

Franck. supra note 29, at 523.
Id.
Reisman, supra note 1. at 95.
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Its main political organ is the Council of

Ministers, which makes decisions usually on the basis of majority
rule. The Community Treaties explicitly recognize the European
Court of Justice (European Court) as the guardian Union legality
vis-a-vis the other organs and the Member States. This court
possesses a clear cut "constitutional" authority to interpret the
Community Treaties and to annul measures adopted by other EU
organs. 47
Thus, it is plausible to invoke concepts like the
"institutional balance" between Union organs, as the European
Court of Justice has done, to reinforce the judicial protection of
the European Parliament as the embodiment of democratic
principles. 48 The active role played by the European Court enjoys
a sufficient "statutory" mandate under the Union Treaties and the
Court has figured in helping to enlarge rather than to restrain
European
Union competencies.
Contrasted
with
the
comprehensive powers of the European Court, the ICJ's
intervention in the administration of the Charter and the
occasions for it to pronounce upon the effect of Security Council
resolutions depend on rather hazardous and incidental elements:
a proper case brought by the proper parties under proper
submission to the Hague. Because the International Court of
Justice possesses no power of annulment, the impact of its

reasoning regarding the illegality of a Security Council resolution
will often be left to speculative guessing. In addition, the ICJ's
decisions cannot claim binding effect erga omnes.
Moreover, there is no doctrine of separation of powers nor of
judicial review that easily could be distilled from a comparative
analysis as a general and, at the same time, sufficiently concrete
concept. Even within the family of western constitutionalism,
there exists a whole doctrinal spectrum ranging from absolute
judicial deference,
to legislative choices, to full-fledged
constitutional jurisdiction, from the nullity of the deficient law, to
the verdict of unconstitutionality with effects only pro futuro.
Moreover, it is by no means clear what is the common point of
reference for a comparative analysis, the tertium comparationis:
Are Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII to be
analogized to legislative acts or, as "police actions", to executive
measures?
Finally, modern constitutions with judicial review preserve
the effectiveness of the legal order with subtly tuned mechanisms

47. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC
TREATY] art. 164.
48. Case 138/79, SA Roquette Frdres v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360;
Case C-70/88. Council v. Parliament, 1990 E.C.R. 2041, 2072.
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which ensure that even a potentially unconstitutional act will
have certain binding effects. Such mechanisms are foreign to the
UN system. Unbalanced mobilization of judicial review for
"constitutional" restraints threatens to affect not only the
authority of the Security Council, but also the legitimacy of the
whole system. The aggregation of the veto of the permanent
members of the Security Council and nebulous "constitutional"
restraints easily may cripple a security system that has just
begun to display some vitality.
B. The Authoritative Concretizationof ChapterWI by the Security
Council
Beyond these structural defects, the constitutional approach
obscures another vital aspect.
The quest for "constitutional"
restraints based on a separation of powers doctrine distorts an
essential functional issue: the authoritative concretization of the
Charter by the Security Council as opposed to a fully justiciable
interpretation. The authoritative concretization by the Security
Council not only extends to the appreciation of facts and
evidence, but also has an important normative component: the
mandate for a dynamic construction of Chapter VII, which goes
well beyond the mechanical application of the relevant provisions
according to traditional canons of legal craftsmanship. This

concretization imposes itself upon the other organs of the United
Nations, including the ICJ, within certain limits flowing from the
purposes of the Charter and from customary international law.
The UN Charter couches the competence of the Security
Council under Chapter VII in very broad terms. The notions of
"threat to the peace" and "breach of the peace" and, to a lesser
degree, "act of aggression" contained in Article. 39 of the Charter
are rather indeterminate formulas that obviously shall vest wide
powers of appreciation in the Security Council. 4 9
The
determination of the corresponding conditions that might bring
this Article into operation are contingent upon a political
judgment by the Security Council. In this respect, Chapter VII
calls for a subjective determination.5 0 This degree of discretion
invested in the Security Council is corroborated by the Charter
travaux prdparatolres.5 '
In the Lockerble case, even voices
49. Giorgio Gaja, Reflexions sur le Role du Consell de Securltd darts le Novel
Ordre Mondlal, 97 REV. GtN. D. INT'L PUBLIC 297. 305 (1993); Rosalyn Higgins, The
Place of InternationalLaw in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 1. 16 (1970).
50. Reisman, supra note 1. at 93.

51. See the Rapporteur of Committee 111/3 on Article 39: "The Committee...
decided to adhere to the text drawn at Dumbarton Oaks and to leave to the
Council the entire discretion as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of
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emphasizing the Security Council's legal restraints acknowledge
the far-reaching discretion of the Council under Article 39.52
This latitude of authoritative judgment allowed to the Security
Council also refers to the construction of Article 39.
The
distinction between the interpretation of a norm and its
application to a concrete set of facts, a distinction already rather
problematic in domestic constitutional and administrative law,
cannot be upheld rigidly in the context of the UN system. The
application of Article 39 of the Charter to the repression of
minorities and other gross violations of human rights goes far
beyond a discretionary appreciation of facts. It touches upon the
very scope of Chapter VII as a matter of legal construction. The
discretion accorded to the Security Council under Chapter VII is
even more sweeping regarding the choice of reactions made
available by an authoritative determination of the existence of the
conditions described in Article 39.
The concretization of powers by political organs is a familiar
phenomenon in constitutional law. It has been recognized in
even the most elaborate system of constitutional jurisdiction, that
of Germany. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
(German Court) has emphasized that particularly "open" norms
in the Basic Law are subject to a continuous process of
"concretization" by the political organs concerned and that the
German Court, while exercising powers of constitutional review,
must respect the process within certain limits. 5 3
These

considerations also apply to rules of procedure. Thus, the ICJ
has accepted the "concretization" of Article 27 (3) of the Charter
by the Security Council's practice to the effect that only a veto by
a permanent member, and not mere abstention, bars the valid
adoption of a resolution. In the context of this ruling, the ICJ
referred to a "continuous and uniform interpretation" by the

the peace or an act of aggression." 12 United Nations Conference on International
Organization 505 (1945); Michael Krbkel, Din BINDUNGSWIRKUNG VON RESOLUTIONEN
DES SICHERHEITSRATES DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN GEGENOBER MITGLIEDSTAATEN 66
(1977).
52. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramanty stated:
[T]he determination under Article 39 of the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, is one entirely within the
discretion of the Council. It would appear that the Council and no other is
the judge of the existence of the state of affairs which brings Chapter VII
into operation. That decision is taken by the Security Council in its own
judgment and in the exercise of the full discretion given to it by Article 39.

53.
(1983).

62

ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG

DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS

1, 39
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Council and its acceptance by the members of the
4
Organization. 5
Under the Charter, the primary safeguard against an
unbalanced dynamism does not lie with judicial control, but
rather with a political check-the veto.
This safeguard is
conceived as a kind of compensation, not so much for a truly
representative basis of the Security Council, but rather for a
broad homogeneity regarding metajuridical values in the
community of nations. This homogeneity is the necessary basis
for justiciable standards of rationality and corresponding
restraints upon political discretion. Thus, the primary restraint
and check against excessive interventionism by the Security
Council lies with an inherent element of the decisionmaking
process within this body itself. This element, and not dynamic
intervention by the ICJ, is the main guardian of the Security
Council's abstention from irrationality and abuse of powers. This
consideration suggests that the ICJ should interfere with the
Security Council's discretion only when the latter clearly abuses
it. While disenchantment with the composition of the Council
and the recent functioning of the veto system may call for a
reform of the Charter, it forms no sound basis for judicial
activism.

IV.

JUSTICIABLE LIMITS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S COMPETENCE

The deference to political choices taken by the Security
Council under authority of Chapter VII and the concretization of
this power cannot be tantamount to allowing the Security Council
to define Its own powers, a "Kompetenzkompetenz." The Security
Council clearly is bound by procedural and substantive rules any
disrespect of which would taint its resolutions with illegality.
Justiciable restraints on the procedural level can be
formulated rather clearly.
Even in this context, however,
deviations from the Charter may be covered by legitimate
concretization, as in the case of the generous handling of
abstentions by one of the five permanent members under Article
27(3) of the Charter.5 5 The degree of the permissible development
of legal rules via Security Council's practice depends upon three
factors: First, the degree of deviation from an "orthodox"
construction of development provisions, having a regard to the
traditional methods of interpretation; second, the acceptance
54. Nambla Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 22. See also Bruno Sinima & Stefan
Brunner, Kapitel V. Der Slcherheltsrat In CHARTA DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN art. 27,
46, at 412 (Bruno Sinma ed., 1991).
55. See Simma & Brunner, supra note 54.
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within the United Nations; 5 6 and, third, the duration of the
Security Council's practice. Thus, the admission of Russia as the
late Soviet Union's successor to the Security Council certainly
could have been challenged, if this step ab initio had been
opposed by other successor states or by a significant segment of
the General Assembly. At the present stage, it would seem a
rather delicate task for the ICJ to subject this rather generous
handling of the Charter to judicial review. This reasoning is not
based on acquiescence in this strict sense or the preclusion of
legal challenges by lapse of time. It rather refers to a modification
of legal rules by the Security Council's practice sanctioned by the
other protagonists in the institutional system of the United
Nations. As the modification of Article 27(3) of the Charter
recognized by the ICJ, this process of procedural development via
Security Council practices bears some affinity to the creation of
customary institutional law.
As to the Security Council's determination that there is a
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or even an act of

aggression in the terms of Article 39 of the Charter, 57 the
underlying components of such a statement are in varying
degrees covered by the Security Council's powers of appreciation.
The assumption that a state has violated international law must
be entirely open to judicial scrutiny regarding the legal appraisal
of the state's behavior. 5 8 By contrast, the conclusions drawn
from nonconclusive evidence are covered by the Security
Council's latitude of judgment. A change in the factual basis for
the decision by fresh evidence may affect, however, the legality of
the Security Council's judgment. 5 9 The appraisal of breaches of
international obligations regarding their weight and political
impact, again, is subject to the Security Council's powers of
appreciation.
The most intriguing aspect of implied limitations upon the
Security Council's power under Chapter VII concerns the range of
binding measures available to the Security Council. The Charter
itself does not label any specific sovereign rights of states as
intangible and sacrosanct, nor does the Charter refer to any
elementary standards of rationality such as the prohibition of
arbitrary measures. It also seems rather clear that non-Charter

56. Acceptance means explicit or tacit approbation by the General Assembly
or the majority of individual Member States.
57. See supra note 13.
58. GaJa, supranote 50, at 315.

59. Legality of the decision will be affected by change in the factual basis for
the decision subsequent to its adoption by the Security Council.
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rights and obligations flowing from treaties must give way to the
Security Council's discretion. This inference is warranted by
Article 103 of the Charter, as the decision of the Hague Court in
the Lockerble case seems to recognize. 6O
However, there are some elementary, justiciable principles
that limit the Security Council's discretion. Hans Kelsen's quasiabsolutist view of the Security Council as an organ largely
exempted from compliance with international law61 seems hardly
sustainable nowadays. 6 2 The powers of the Security Council are
based on treaty.
Therefore, the peremptory norms of
international law provide insurmountable limitations upon both
the conferment and the exercise of competence flowing from the
Charter. Of course, it is true that many rules ofjus cogens do not
apply at all to "police actions" of the United Nations or
presuppose the existence of the Security Council's intervention
under Chapter VII, like the prohibition of the use of force. There

are some iron rules, however, that restrain even action under
Chapter VII.
For example, the humanitarian standards of
customary law on armed conflicts leave no room for modification
by the Security Council. An absolute embargo based upon Article
41 that extends to the affected population's access to medicine
would violate peremptory human rights law. Moreover, there is
an even more elementary limitation:
a state's claim to
substantial preservation of the components of statehood. An
international order demanding a state to sacrifice Its own
existence or to suffer the complete erosion of vital options
regarding the management of its territory would overstrain
legitimate expectations of compliance, and by such excessive
imposition, undermine its own normativity. This contention lies
at the core of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's claim before the
International Court of Justice that the arms embargo should not

60.

The Court held that:

[Bloth Libya and the United States, as Members of the United
Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; ... the Court, which
is at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures, considers that
prima facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in resolution
748 (1992); and ... in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the
obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations
under any other international agreement, including the Montreal

Convention.
Lockerble Case, 1992 I.C.J. at 126. See also Franck, supra note 29, at 521.
61. Hans Kelsen, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1964).

62. See Mohammed BedJaoui, Du Controle de Legalltd des Actes du Consell de
Securt, NOUVEAUX ITIN1RAlRES EN DROIT-HOMMAGE A FRANcOIs RIoAUX 69, 83
(1993).
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be construed to defeat Bosnia's right to self-determination. 63 In
this context, the very self-preservation of a state is at issue.
Similarly, the deposition of an effective government and its
replacement by a group of the Security Council's choice would
exceed the competence of the Security Council.
Finally, there are good grounds for submitting the Security
Council's discretion to some kind of proportionality analysis. It
may be strongly argued that over the past decades, some
interrelation between the degree of interference with a state's
rights and the aim pursued has emerged as a general principle of
law. Action under Chapter VII can be analogized to police actions
that in most of the more developed administrative law systems
are subject to the prohibition of means that are either
unnecessary for the goal pursued or out of proportion in the light
of the damage inflicted. Even in some of the great legal systems
that are reluctant to recognize the principle of proportionality,
such as the English common law, these elements are often an
integral part of the judicial scrutiny of unreasonableness.6 4 Of
course, the application of a proportionality standard must respect
the Security Council's discretion on the appropriate measures
and prohibits only the manifest excess and disproportion.
Beyond that, there is no room for the application of a general test
The mere
of "irrationality" as applied under English law.65
decision
with the
vests
any
Security
Council
existence of the veto
irrebuttable presumption of rationality.

V.

DEFICIENT RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR INVALIDITY

Article 25 of the Charter obliges all Member States to "accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter." 6 6 The binding effect of mandatory
resolutions stands and falls with their validity. The formula "in
63.

Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993
I.C.J. 3, 6 (Apr. 8).
64. See, e.g., Council of Civil Service Unions v. -Minister for the Civil Service
(H.L. (E.)), 1985 App. Cas. 374, 410 (opinion of Lord Diplock); J. Beatson, Note,
Proportionality, 104 LAw Q. REV. 180 (1988); Matthias Herdegen, Landesbercht
Groflbritannlen, in

DIE KONTROLLDICHTE

BEI DER GERICHTLICHEN

PROFUNG VON

HANDLUNGEN IN DER VERWALTUNG 38, 46 (J.A. Frowein ed., 1993).
65. Council of Civil Service Unions, 1985 App. Cas. at 410 (opinion of Lord
Diplock) ("It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or
of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to
the question to be decided could have arrived at it.").
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
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accordance with the present Charter" contained in Article 25 is
ambiguous.6 7 This language may only refer to mandatory
compliance, such as compliance with binding resolutions but it is
also plausible to interpret this formula as a reservation regarding
resolutions not adopted in accordance with the Charter.
The resulting controversy of interpretation is not as dramatic
as it may seem. First, there cannot be any doubt that certain
defects of mandatory resolutions destroy their binding effect.
Second, the considerable powers of concretization under Chapter
VII and the political discretion of the Security Council, as a
general rule, limit the possible illegality to manifest excesses of its
competence. Finally, it should be easy to reach consensus on the
link between validity and the observance of elementary rules of
procedure. Nonobservance of this procedural standard deprives a
resolution of its validity.68
Whether a Member State also can challenge a mandatory
resolution on substantive grounds is a matter of dispute. The
restrictive view denies Member States the ability to object,
arguing that substantive challenges would undermine the
functioning of the Security Council of the United Nations.6 9 This
restrictive doctrine has the far-reaching consequence of barring
the ICJ from a similar scrutiny, despite a manifest excess of
powers of a mandatory resolution of the Security Council. A

total immunity from judicial review seems hardly sustainable.
The Security Council's powers of concretization cover the grey
areas of construction under Chapter VII. Overstepping these
wide powers means invalidity. There remain only the rare cases
in which the Security Council may intrude upon vital positions of
States when the scope of the interference is not subject to the
Security Council's discretion. An example is the humanitarian
rules on the use of military force against a State. Only evident
excesses, in the appraisal of evidence or in the application of the
law, should entail invalidity.7 0 This is an exceptional case,
however, in which illegality is not automatically linked to the
overstepping of already broad powers and in which invalidity
therefore requires an additional element, the obvious character of
the deficiency. In this situation, the legal restraints upon the
Security Council are stricter than the standards of validity.

67. See Jost Delbrfick, In CHARTA DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN, supra note 54,
art. 25, 6, at 17.
68. See Id. at 18.
69. See 2 Georg Dahm, VOLKERRECHT 212 (1961); Delbrilck, supra note 68, V
18.
70. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1962
I.C.J. 150, 221-22 (July 20) (opinion of Judge MorelUi).
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It must be conceded that the connection of invalidity with the
manifest excess of powers contains elements of uncertainty. The
preservation of the functions of the Security Council under
Chapter VII and of the standard of compliance under Article 25,
however, calls for a concept that raises the threshold of invalidity
beyond the misapplication of the Charter which is not manifest.
The connection of invalidity with the evident excess of powers
refers to a standard that invites the consensus of a large segment
of the community of states under the roof of the United Nations.
In light of the actual basis of jurisdiction for the ICJ, a more
active role of the Hague Court on judicial review of the Security
Council's resolutions as such does not yield a higher degree of
legal position and certainty.
The main thrust of this Article lies in the argument for a
concurrent capacity of the ICJ and of the individual Member
State to challenge the validity of a Security Council resolution. It
cannot be denied that the present scope of the ICJ's jurisdiction
The call for a modification in the
is rather unsatisfactory.
composition and the procedure of the Security Council certainly
Such modifications of the institutional
has its attractions.

framework of the United Nations may also call for a revision of
the proposed standards of justiciability.
Finally, a Member State will deny the validity of a mandatory
Security Council resolution always at its own risk, a risk only
mitigated by the speculative hope of subsequent vindication by
the ICJ. It lies with the Security Council itself, by relying upon
recognized methods of legal interpretation and pursuing a
coherent policy, to vest its position with persuasive force and to
reduce noncompliance to an isolated phenomenon, with
It is the Security
dissuasive consequences for the objector.
Council itself that is the primary guardian of its own legitimacy.

